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BOOK REVIEWS
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE COMMON LAW: THE DECLINE OF
THE DOCTRINES OF SEPARATION OF POWERS AND FEDERA-

LISM. By Randall Bridwell and Ralph U. Whitten. Lexington,
Mass.: D. C. Heath and Company, 1977. Pp. xv, 206.
JAMES W. ELY, JR.*
During the past decade American legal history has enjoyed something of
a renaissance. Scholars have explored the reception of English common law in
colonial American,' the impact of the Revolution upon the legal system,2 the
court structure of early America, 3 and the history of the organized bar. 4
Legal historians have also edited previously unavailable judicial records and
legal papers.5 Perhaps the most hotly debated question in recent years has
been the character and use of common law in 19th century America.
The solid monograph by Randall Bridwell and Ralph U. Whitten 6 is an
important contribution to the literature on this subject. Based on extensive
research in a variety of fields, this volume analyzes the nature of common law
and the function of the federal courts in the first half of the 19th century.
Since the authors sharply question the conventional wisdom, their study is
bound to be a center of controversy. Bridwell and Whitten focus primarily on
questions of private law as administered by the federal courts under diversity
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of citizenship jurisdiction. They challenge "the nearly universal insistence"
that judicial decisionmaking was "the product of the rational efforts of the
government (or some component of the government such as the judiciary) to
treat a perceived problem." 7 On the contrary, the authors vigorously maintain that the ante-bellum legal order developed through unplanned private
ordering and is best understood as a customary law system. The principal
characteristic of this system was "a decisional process or function that was
designed to vindicate the legitimate and discernable expectations of the parties to any given dispute." 8
To demonstrate this thesis the authors trace diversity jurisdiction as
understood in the early 19th century. Diversity jurisdiction, of course, was intended to prevent bias in deciding the claims of nonresidents. One concern
was prejudicial determination of factual issues, but the federal courts were
also expected to apply the private law rules which harmonized with the expectancy of the parties. Thus, common law adjudication placed considerable
discretion in the hands of federal judges, but denied them the power to make
law according to a subjective view of wise policy. The authors emphasize:
the proper role of the judge in the common law process did not extend to intervention on behalf of particular classes of litigants to the disadvantage of
others, or to the legislation of rules that would operate in an ex post facto
manner to the transaction of the parties. 9

The common law which the federal courts utilized was private and
customary in origin. These common law rules, the authors declare, were not
the product of a sovereign command but reflected the autonomous behavior
of parties over a period of time. For example, the principles of commercial
law "had still originated in the private transactions of merchants and could
be altered or abrogated by them in the future, or disregarded in particular
future transactions by use of the proper forms."' 0 The federal judicial role in
this field was largely confined to determining the relevant commercial practices and applying them to the case at issue. This indicates why judicial decisions in this period were sometimes characterized, not as law, but merely as
evidence of law. The common law permitted individuals wide latitude in'
which to order their affairs. Thus, the common law method envisioned individual responsibility for one's own actions, and the system allowed "the
chips to fall where they might in the event of nonplanning."'I
This view of the common law powers of early federal courts leads to a
radical reassessment of Swift v. Tyson, 12 an opinion which the authors feel
1R. BRIDWELL & R. WHITTEN, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE COMMON LAW xiv (1977)
[hereinafter cited as R. BRIDWELL & R. WHITrEN].
Uid. at 4.
VId. at 22.

0Id. at 66.
"Id. at 114.
141 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
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has been badly misunderstood by contemporary commentators. Taking issue
with those legal historians who see Swift as an attempt to fashion a uniform
procommercial legal policy,' 3 Bridwell and Whitten assert that the result was
"a prime example of how the diversity jurisdiction operated to preserve the
intentions and expectations of the parties intact when their dealings had
taken place against the assumed background of general commercial practice." 14 An independent federal judgment on the applicable commercial law
was designed to safeguard the noncitizen who relied on general mercantile
customs rather than local rules of business conduct.
The authors further note that Justice Joseph Story's Swift opinion interpretating Section 34 of the 1789 Judiciary Act has been misconstrued. Story
did not conclude that federal courts in diversity cases must apply state
statutes but were free to fashion their own view of common law. Rather, the
distinction he drew was between "questions of a more general nature" and
state law local in character, including both statutes and "long established
local customs having the force of laws."' 5 In some instances involving commercial law federal courts disregarded state statutes, or constructions of them
by state courts, to preserve the protective function of diversity jurisdiction.
On the other hand, Bridwell and Whitten consider the disposition of diversity
cases involving real property in order to test the consistency with which the
federal courts adhered to the Swift formula. They found that the federal
tribunals normally followed state law, either statute or common law, in property decisions. Holding a positive view of Swift, the authors declare that "the
common law authority of the federal courts as it was actually employed between 1789 and about 1860 is constitutionally justifiable."'' 6
Bridwell and Whitten assert that after 1860 the federal courts began to
alter their earlier decisional techniques in a manner which violated both the
limits of federalism and the separation of powers doctrine. Examining
municipal bond and tort cases, the authors contend that federal courts began
to distort Swift by dictating in effect legislative solutions to such litigation.
Municipal bonds were obviously creatures of local law, and torts were clearly
tied to rules of civil right and wrong determined by the sovereign. Yet federal
tribunals found both to be areas of general law and proceeded to fashion an
independent federal governing law. As the legislative model of judicial
behavior gained acceptance in the late 19th century, autonomous private
behavior lost its vitality as both a source of and restriction upon judicial
authority.
11G. GILMORE. THE AGES OF AMERicAN LAw 30-34 (1977); M. HoRwrrz. THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 245-52 (1977) [hereinafter cited as M. HoRwrrz]; Heckman,
The Relationship of Swift v. Tyson to the Status of CommercialLaw in the Nineteenth Century
and the Federal System, 17 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 246 (1973).
14R. BRIDWELL & R. WHITrE, supra note 7, at 90.
"141
U.S. at 18.
16 R. BRIDWELL & R. WHrrrEN, supra note 7, at 90.
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By the 20th century Swift was seen through new glasses. Influenced by
the positivist notion that all law reflected an exercise of sovereign will, the
Supreme Court in Erie17 overruled Swift but "failed to render an accurate
description of what the Swift decision really represented in the context of early nineteenth-century jurisprudence." 1' 8 The Erie court viewed Swift as based
upon the notion that federal courts create common law rules. Hence, the
Supreme Court perceived a conflict as to which sovereign-state or
federal-could constitutionally declare the governing law in diversity cases.
The authors contended that Erie "represented a change in judicial philosophy
about the nature of common law decision making as well as a shift in viewpoint about the proper constitutional role of the federal courts vis-a-vis the
state courts."1 9
As one would expect, Bridwell and Whitten have little good to say about
the Erie doctrine. They tax Justice Louis D. Brandeis' opinion as being
historically inaccurate, mistaken about the scope of congressional power to
enact substantive rules, and a failure in preventing federal courts from
fashioning federal common law in many areas of national concern.10 Compared to Swift, the authors maintain that Erie is "less efficient" and is "in
21
fact far less restrictive" on the exercise of federal judicial authority.
How did this judicial and scholarly misinterpretation of Swift occur?
Bridwell and Whitten maintain that "[t]he fundamental mistake in this process has been the assumption that the legal order has continuously operated
according to certain modern precepts, or at least has done so since some indeterminate point in time in the past."2 2 In essence, the authors suggest that
legal historians have been guilty of reading history backwards. As a consequence, it was easy to adopt the erroneous view that judges consciously devised common law rules to achieve policy goals.
It is apparent that the conclusions of Bridwell and Whitten are
diametrically opposed to those of the recently emerged instrumentalist school.
Indeed, the authors repeatedly and sharply assail Morton J. Horwitz, the
leading instrumentalist historian. According to Horwitz, in 18th century
America common law principles were not understood as a tool of legal
change. Rather, the common law was seen as a body of fixed doctrine,
grounded in natural law and custom, to be applied between private litigants.
The role of the judge was correspondingly limited to the discovery of these
pre-existing rules. However, Horwitz argues that after the Revolution
American judges began to see common law adjudication "as an instrument of
17

Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
BRIDWELL & R. WHITrEN. supra note 7, 136.
191d. at 1.
20

11R.

For post-Esie federalization of law see G. GILMORE, THE AGEs OF AMERICAN LAW 93-98
(1977); Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV.
383 (1964).
21
R. BRIDWELL
2
1d.

& G.

WHITrEN. supra note 7, at xiii (emphasis in original).
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policy," 23 and private law questions were increasingly considered in terms of
their social and economic impact. Horwitz observes:
In short, by 1820 the process of common-law decision-making had taken on
many of the qualities of legislation. As Judges began to conceive of common
law adjudication as a process of making and not merely discovering legal
rules, they were led to frame general doctrines
based on a self-conscious con24
sideration of social and economic policies.
Two major results follow from the Horwitz thesis. First, this shift in legal
theory concentrated broad powers of a legislative character in the judiciary.
Second, the new instrumentalist attitude was utilized to fashion legal doctrines hospitable to commercial and industrial growth. The instrumentalist
judge became the handmaiden of mercantile interests. Through a reinterpretation of private law rules governing torts, property, and contracts, Horwitz charges, the courts "actively promoted a legal redistribution of wealth
' 25
against the weakest groups in the society.
Bridwell and Whitten take exception to both the methodology and
findings of Horwitz. They accuse him of reading evidence out of context, of
exercising improper selectivity in marshalling examples, and of inaccurately
describing the traditional conception of the common law. Let us consider a
few instances of specific disagreement. Central to the Horwitz thesis is his
contention that the basis of common law authority was reformulated following the Revolution. As the older theory of the common law as a manifestation
of inherent justice collapsed, the legitimacy of common law was explained in
terms of popular consent. Yet the authors muster impressive evidence to
demonstrate that the consensual explanation of common law was not new in
26
post-revolutionary America.
Conflict of laws is another major area of disagreement between the
authors and Horwitz. Horwitz sees the development of the conflicts approach
in the 19th century as the consequence of a changing conception of the common law. As judges recognized that different common law rules represented
divergent social policies, the resolution of legal conflicts between jurisdictions
could not be determined by reference to a uniform common law. Bridwell
and Whitten, on the other hand, declare that variation in rules was entirely
compatible with the common law system grounded in natural reason. "Consequently," they write, "a conflict of laws approach with which to reconcile differences between jurisdictions in multistate disputes is precisely what one
27
would expect the traditional common law system to produce."
The authors also accuse Horwitz of relying on a conspiracy theory to exISM. HoRwirz.
4
2251d. at 2.
1d. at 254.
1

supra note 13, at 3.

2 R. BRIDWELL & R. WHITTEN. i fua note 7, at 24-27.
21
7 d. at 87.
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plain the transformation of common law. "One marvels at the scope of the
conspiracy Horwitz describes," they note, "and the almost uniform participation in it by the judges." 28 The mere fact that judiciial decisions had some
economic impact does not establish that ante-bellum judges were consciously
fashioning policy or dictating procommercial results. Bridwell and Whitten
argue that Horwitz "has failed to offer any convincing proof that the conception of the common law process" changed before 1860.29
One of the most interesting contributions of The Constitution and the
Common Law is the analysis of the heated debate over prosecuting commont
law crimes in federal court. Largely forgotten today except by historians, this
was one of the most divisive early issues in the history of American law. The
legal problem was complicated by political implicatons and partisan strife.
Charles Warren observed:.
The assertion of the jurisdiction of the United States Courts in cases involving
criminal indictments based on English common law and on international law,
in the absence of any Federal penal statute, had been especially obnoxious to
the Anti-Federalists; and the successive cases had been regarded with growing
alarm-principally because such common law indictments had been chiefly
employed in convictions of persons accused of pro-French activities.2 0

The starting point for the controversy over common law crimes was the
Judiciary Act of 1789 which vested the federal courts with "cognizance of all
crimes and offenses that shall be cognizable under the authority of the United
States." ' Early federal cases indicated that most judges believed that the
federal courts could properly hear criminal cases at common law. 32 In 1799
Chief Justice Oliver Ellsworth specifically advised grand jurors that indictments could be based on common law, and that "by the rules of a known
law, matured by the reason of ages and which Americans have ever been
tenacious of as a birthright, you will decide what acts are misdemeanors, on
the ground of their opposing the existence of the National government or the
efficient exercise of its legitimate powers."33
The ultimate rejection of a federal jurisdiction over crimes at common
law has not stilled the historical debate,34 and a variety of interpretations
'Id.

at 56.

29

1d. at 28.

159 (1926).
3 Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, §§ 9, 11, 1 Stat. 76, 79.
2
3 E.g., United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1147 (C.C.D. Mass. 1792); Henfield's Case, 11 F.
Cas. 1099 (C.C.D. Penn. 1793); United States v. Ravara, 27 F. Cas. 147 (C.C.D. Penn. 1794).
For the leading contrary opinion see United States v. Worrall, 28 F. Cas. 774 (C.C.D. Penn.
1798). A helpful analysis of the Worrall case is provided in S. Pressler, A Tale of Two Judges:
Richard Peters, Samuel Chase, and the Broken Promise of Federalist Jurisprudence, (an earlier
version of this unpublished paper was presented to the American Society for Legal History on
November 4, 1977).
53
As quoted in C. WARREN. supra note 30, at 162.
54
E.g., United States v. Hudson and Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812).
3 C. WARREN. THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY
1
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have been advanced over the years. Most of the initial objections were phrased in terms of federalism. "If the principles were to prevail," Thomas Jefferson warned in 1800, "of a common law being in force in the United States" it
would "possess the general government at once of all the powers of the state
governments and reduce [the country] to a single consolidated government."3 5
This Jeffersonian argument confused common law as a source of jurisdiction
with common law as a body of rules to be administered within a jurisdiction,
already established. Some historians have suggested that the problem of
judges exercising common law criminal jurisdiction could have been solved by
a legislative delegaton of power. Indeed, in 1923 Charles Warren concluded
that a framers of the Judiciary Act intended to vest the federal courts with
such authority.3 6 Horwitz strikingly contends that the assault on federal common law crimes was the first manifestation of the broader change in the conception of law described above.37 More recently, Stephen B. Presser maintains
that the debate over common law crimes must be understood within the
political context of the 1790's and the declining fortunes of the Federalist
Party.38
Bridwell and Whitten offer a fresh explanation for the common law
crimes imbroglio. They concur with most scholars that the Jeffersonian objections concerned with an alleged invasion of state rights were mistaken, and
that the problem is best analyzed in terms of separation of powers. In other
words, the basic issue involved not federal-state relations, but the appropriate
function of the judiciary. The authors also reject the Horwitz view as "overbroad" and "quite erroneous." 3 9 According to Bridwell and Whitten, the very
nature of common law crimes is distinct from the more general problem of
common law authority. The "fundamental objection" to a federal common
law criminal jurisdiction "is that criminal law results peculiarly from an exercise of the sovereign lawmaking authority, which in our system was originally
confided to the legislative branch of government." 40 In civil cases at common
law, judges followed established custom derived from the behavior of private
parties. Since the definition of criminal activity required some arbitrary judgment by the sovereign, "the open-ended nature of the selection process and
the lack of popular participation in it . . . made any exercise of judicial

authority inappropriate." 4' It follows that the controversy over common law
crimes was not the harbinger of a general alteration in the conception of

357 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 451 (P. Ford ed.).
"6Warren, New Light on the History of the FederalJudiciary Act of 1789, 37
REV. 49 (1923). Warren's view is rejected by J. GOEBEL. JR.. HISTORY OF THE SUPREME
THE UNITED STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO
37

1801 495-96 (1971).

M. HoRwrrz, supra note 13, at 9-16.

s8S. Presser, supra note 32, at 56-65.
9
1R. BRIDWELL & R. WHrrrE, supra note 7, at 50.
101d. at 46.
"Id. at 49.

HARv.
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common law, but rather a belated recognition of the unique legislative
character of criminal law.
The volume is not without some minor problems. The nature of common
law and the scope of federal diversity jurisdiction as described by the authors
are quite intricate. Clearly there was some degree of uncertainty as to the
proper choice of common law rules, and hence some room for sub rosa
judicial lawmaking. Bridwell and Whitten may underestimate the policymaking potential open to judges under a traditional view of common law. In
addition, the authors' stress on the importance of Justice Story comes close to
an indispensable man theory of history. Describing Story as "the most learned
and scholarly man ever to sit on the high bench," they attribute in large
measure the decline of the common law system to his death. 42 Yet if the common law decisional techniques outlined by Bridwell and Whitten were working properly no single person would be crucial to its continued vitality. As
this suggests, the authors might have done more to explore the post-1860 shift
to new methods of decision. Did the Civil War have an impact on legal
reasoning? William E. Nelson, for instance, has argued that the anti-slavery
43
movement influenced the post-bellum judicial style.
This reviewer wishes that Bridwell and Whitten had considered a wider
variety of subject matter areas. For instance, they might have tested their
thesis with a treatment of the development of corporate law in the early 19th
century, a process in which Justice Story played a key role. It has been argued
that the courts, both state and federal, were anxious to facilitate the growth
of business corporations and deliberately shaped the law to this end.44 One
should also note that The Constitution and the Common Law proceeds on a
sophisticated level and might prove difficult for the general reader.
The volume can best be viewed as an effort to revive the conservative
tradition of American legal history. Rejecting economic and social interpretations of law, the authors see ante-bellum common law as the embodiment of
neutral principles derived from custom. They assert that the common law
system minimized the room for judicial intervention in private affairs.
Although subject to recent criticism, 45 this outlook has a basically postitive
character. Surely the attempt to separate the administration of justice from
political considerations is one of the greatest accomplishments of the AngloAmerican law. Bridwell and Whitten have written a significant book which
merits the close attention of legal historians.
4

11d. at 123.
SNelson, The Impact of the Antislavery Movement Upon Styles of Judicial Reasoning in

4

Nineteenth Century America, 87 RARV. L. REV. 513 (1974).
44
M. HoRwITz. supra note 13, at 111-14; L. FRIEDMAN. A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW
174-76 (1973); G. DUNNE. JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY AND THE RISE OF THE SUPREME COURT 179-84

(1970).4 5

Horwitz, The Conservative Tradition in the Writing of American Legal History, 17 AM. J.
LEGAL HisT. 275 (1973). Compare Presser, Book Review, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 700 (1977).

